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Abstract 
 
This study examines the extent of Indonesian companies’ compliance with the Indonesian ac-
counting regulations (IARC) of inventory, fixed assets, and depreciation by analyzing 160 In-
donesian listed companies’ 2006 annual reports. This study also looks at potential factors that 
explain the level of this compliance. Analysis reveals a high level of 71.63% inventory compli-
ance, 51.13% fixed assets compliance, and 99.69% depreciation compliance with accounting 
rules. T-test and regression analysis show that firm size is a significant predictor of accounting 
compliance. Importantly, ownership and governance structures do not influence the level of 
compliance. Although Indonesian firms complied with more than 50% of the key accounting 
rule provisions, regulatory intervention appears needed to improve compliance. Such regulation 
might include sanctions as promulgated by multilateral financial organizations (World Bank 
2005). 
 
Keywords: compliance, Indonesia, listed firms, ownership concentration, govern-
ance structures, regulatory intervention and accounting standards 
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Introduction 
 
This study examines the extent of Indo-
nesian companies’ compliance with the 
Indonesian  accounting  regulations 
(IARC) of inventory, fixed assets, and 
depreciation. This study also examines 
factors that influence listed companies 
compliance with these Indonesian ac-
counting  standards.  These  factors  in-
clude ownership concentration (top one 
shareholder),  corporate  governance 
                                 A. Setyadi, et. al. / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1 (2009) 26-44                      27 
 
(independent  commissioners),  size  of 
firm, auditor type, ROA (Return on As-
sets), and industry categories.  Control 
variables are also used including expert 
commissioners, leverage, business com-
plexity, and independent audit commit-
tee. 
 
This study is important for a number of 
reasons.  According  to  the  Indonesian 
Capital  Market  Supervisory  Agency 
(Bapepam, 2000; 2003), the regulatory 
body in Indonesia, accounting compli-
ance is a critical issue in Indonesia’s 
financial  markets,  particularly  as  a 
means of contributing to the national 
economy as an emerging country (World 
Bank 2006).  Further,  compliance  im-
proves  transparency  (Bapepam,  2004; 
JSX 2004b), by allowing standards to be 
comprehensively relied upon by Indone-
sian-listed  users  of  annual  reports 
(Bapepam 2000; 2003). 
 
Using statistical analysis, this study in-
vestigates the degree to which the Indo-
nesian-listed firms comply with the In-
donesian  accounting  standards.  This 
study finds that a high level of 71.63% 
inventory  compliance,  51.13%  fixed 
assets compliance, and 99.69% deprecia-
tion compliance with accounting rules. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next 
section discusses past literature and hy-
potheses development. This is followed 
by a description of the research method 
employed. Two further sections present 
the descriptive statistics and additional 
statistical analysis, respectively. Impli-
cations and conclusions of the paper are 
covered in the final section. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Agency theory is used to inform this 
study which advances the notion that, in 
capital markets, agency problems arise 
where there is a conflict of interest aris-
ing from divergent goals between princi-
pal  and  agent  (Jenson and  Meckling, 
1976),  and  difficulties  in  monitoring 
agents’ actions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In 
capital markets, stakeholders will reduce 
the costs that they want to pay for a 
company’s shares by predicting the ex-
tent of managers’ agency costs (Kurth 
and Lehnert 2006). In theory, a firm will 
select ownership and corporate govern-
ance structures that are well organized to 
reduce agency costs (Fauver and Fuerst 
2006). This theory advances the notion 
that, in capital markets, agency problems 
arise where there is a conflict of interest 
arising  from divergent  goals  between 
principal and agent, and difficulties in 
monitoring agents’ actions (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  In capital markets, stakeholders 
will reduce the costs that they want to 
pay for a company’s shares by predict-
ing the extent of managers’ agency costs 
(Kurth and Lehnert 2006). In theory, a 
firm will select ownership and corporate 
governance structures that are well or-
ganized to reduce agency costs (Fauver 
and Fuerst 2006). The main issue re-
garding  the  firm  is  the  information 
asymmetry between agents and princi-
pals. In terms of information asymmetry, 
communication  between  agents  and 
principals might not always be effective 
(Brennan 2006). Information asymmetry 
happens when the principals’ ability to 
oversee the agents’  performances and 
jobs are limited. Agency theory, in this 
situation, predicts that the agents could 
decrease their performance or may even 
shirk their responsibilities due to their 
ability to conceal such performance defi-
ciencies from the principals (Kunz and 
Pfaff 2002). 
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The findings  of  Shleiver  and  Vishny 
(1997)  and McColgan  (2001)  suggest 
that ownership concentration and inde-
pendent commissioners are the key de-
terminants in terms of agency theory. 
The  costs  of  the  agency  problems, 
‘agency costs’, can be reduced by vary-
ing the governance and ownership struc-
tures. In this regard, agency problems 
occurring from conflicts of interests be-
tween principals  and agents could be 
reduced  if  the  ownership  (principals) 
was less concentrated and if the monitor-
ing between the agent and principal was 
improved by greater independent scru-
tiny. This research offers a useful and 
practical application of agency theory in 
ownership structure and corporate gov-
ernance mechanism context by seeking 
to answer the following overarching re-
search question:  Are the concepts of 
ownership structures and corporate gov-
ernance significant determinants of ac-
counting regulatory compliance in Indo-
nesia?  
 
Ownership  concentration  (Top  one 
shareholder) 
 
Some owners, by virtue of the size of 
their equity positions, effectively have 
some control over the firms they own 
(Villalonga and Amit 2004). In modern 
companies, conflicts of interest between 
corporate insiders, for example control-
ling  shareholders  and  managers,  and 
outside investors, requires close analysis 
(Prasad, Green and Murinde 2001) be-
cause the company’s ownership struc-
ture is deemed a primary determinant of 
the extent of agency problems between 
controlling insiders and outside inves-
tors. 
 
In general, emerging markets, such as 
Indonesia,  have  highly  concentrated 
ownership structures, particularly in the 
form of family ownership (Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang 1999; Lins 2003). 
When ownership is concentrated to a 
degree where the single largest share-
holder has effective control of the firm, 
the nature of the agency problem shifts 
away from the agent-principal conflict. 
Principals-managers  problems  will  be 
less  likely  to  be  about  managements 
(agents)  versus  owners  (shareholders) 
but more focused on minority sharehold-
ers  versus  controlling  shareholders 
(Berglof and Claessens 2004). Shleiver 
and Vishny (1997) argue that, as owner-
ship gets beyond a certain point, large 
owners gain nearly full control and pre-
fer to use firms to generate private bene-
fits  that  are  not  shared  by  minority 
shareholders. Studies by La Porta, Lopez
-de-Silanes, Shleiver, and Vishny (1998) 
and Shleiver and Vishny (1997) show 
the problems associated with high own-
ership  concentration,  and  the  agency 
conflict between large and small share-
holders. When large shareholders effec-
tively control corporations, their policies 
may result in the expropriation of wealth 
from minority shareholders.  The con-
flicts of interest between large and small 
shareholders can be numerous, including 
controlling shareholders enriching them-
selves by transferring profits to other 
companies they control. 
 
Ownership concentration in Indonesia is 
dominated by families or the govern-
ment (Claessens et al. 1999). Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000) found that 
there is evidence of expropriation of mi-
nority shareholders’ wealth by a major-
ity or controlling shareholders.   As a 
result,  McKinsey  (2001)  advises  that 
distinct ownership structures, should be 
examined more explicitly. To formally 
test the impact of ownership concentra-
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tion, the following hypothesis is exam-
ined: 
H1 : There is a negative relationship be-
tween the level of ownership con-
centration  and the level of IARC of 
the firms 
 
Corporate  governance  (Independent 
commissioners) 
 
The issue of corporate governance in 
modern corporations arises because of 
the separation of ownership and control, 
and the diffusion of equity among inves-
tors (Berle and Means 1932). The imple-
mentation of corporate governance im-
pacts on the structures through which the 
objectives  of  the  company  are  set 
(World Bank 2006; Cooper and Owen 
2007), the means by which those objec-
tives are attained, the monitoring of per-
formance, and the ways it can be im-
proved (Ho 2003). The importance of 
corporate governance derived from its 
contribution  to  business  prosperity 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2000), accountability 
(Yong and Guan 2000), competitive in-
vestment  (Claessens,  Glassner  and 
Klingebiel  2002),  transparency OECD 
2002),  and  stakeholder  confidence 
(Jacobidies and Winter 2005). 
 
However,  the application of corporate 
governance in Indonesia is  seen as a 
matter of form rather than of substance 
(Roche 2005). According to the Com-
pany  Law No.1/1995,  the  Indonesian 
company has  a  two tier  management 
structure comprising a board of directors 
headed by a president director and a 
board  of  commissioners  headed by a 
president commissioner (Company Law 
1995)1. Directors manage and represent 
the company on a  day to day basis, 
whilst commissioners supervise and ad-
vise the directors. Commissioners pro-
vide independent oversight of manage-
ment and hold management accountable 
to shareholders for its actions. A widely 
held view is that boards are more effec-
tive in their monitoring of management 
when there is a strong base of independ-
ent commissioners on the board of com-
missioners (Federal Register 2003). This 
condition reduces agency costs associ-
ated with the separation of ownership 
and  control.  In  turn,  this  encourages 
managers  to  accept  agency  control 
mechanisms. An ideal board of commis-
sioners would have a low number of 
commissioners  who are  employees of 
the firm, past or present (Davidson, Ne-
mec, Worrell and Lin 2002). In the con-
text  of  corporate  governance  mecha-
nisms, the board of commissioners is 
properly viewed as the solution for prob-
lems arising from agent-principal rela-
tions.  
 
Weak corporate governance is viewed as 
one of the factors that contributed to the 
Asian financial crisis, including the In-
donesian  experience  (Choi  2000).  In 
Indonesia, Bapepam and Jakarta Stock 
Exchange (JSX) now require all compa-
nies listed on stock exchange to have at 
least 30% of the board as independent 
commissioners (JSX 2004a). It is likely 
that the agency conflict between manag-
ers and shareholders can be reduced by a 
greater  level  of  independent  commis-
sioners. A study by Fitzpatrick (2000) in 
Indonesia  emphasizes  that  external  or 
independent commissioners can improve 
corporate governance. Adam and Me-
hran (2003) suggested that increases in 
the proportion of outside commissioners 
on the board should increase firm per-
formance  as  they  are  more  effective 
monitors of company managers. To test 
1
  Directors and commissioners are appointed by share-
holders at a general meeting (Company Law 1995). 
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the degree of corporate governance as 
measured by independent commission-
ers, the following hypothesis is exam-
ined: 
H2 : There is a positive relationship be-
tween the level of independence of 
the commissioners and the level of 
IARC of the firms 
 
Size of firm 
 
Size of firm has an important effect on a 
firm to disclose compulsorily its corpo-
rate information (Owusu-Ansah 1998). 
Relative to a small firm, a large firm has 
consideralbly more resources to devote 
to corporate reporting (Alchian 1969). 
Large firms are also likely to have a va-
riety of divisions which require exten-
sive  reporting  to  satisfy  stakeholders 
(Dye  1990).  Descriptive  studies 
(Wallace,  Naser  and  Mora  1994;  In-
chausti 1997) indicate a positive associa-
tion between firm size and compliance 
with corporate reporting requirements. It 
is, therefore, hypothesised in the rela-
tionship between firm size and compli-
ance with corporate reporting require-
ments in Indonesia, that: 
H3
 : There is a positive relationship be-
tween the level of firm size and the 
level of IARC of the firms 
 
Auditor type 
 
This research investigates the relation-
ship between auditor type and regulatory 
compliance in the Indonesian context. 
Previous  studies  (Wallace  and  Naser 
1995) find that level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure is less for compa-
nies audited by one of the major auditor 
firms in Hong Kong, but Patton and Ze-
lenka (1997) finds that more firms au-
dited by the major auditor firms in the 
Czech Republic showed higher compli-
ance with mandatory disclosure. 
 
Choice of external auditor is a mecha-
nism that helps improve conflicts of in-
terest  between  agent  and  owner 
(principal) (Craswell and Taylor 1992). 
Large auditor firms  can act as a mecha-
nism to minimise agency cost and exert 
more of monitoring role by limiting op-
portunistic behaviour by agents (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmer-
man 1983). DeAngelo (1981) finds that 
companies audited by the major  auditor 
firms have substantial agency costs, and 
try to reduce agency costs by employing 
the major auditor firms. Thus, on the 
basis of this position, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H4: There is a positive relationship be-
tween firms audited by Big 4 audi-
tor and the level of IARC of the 
firms 
 
ROA (Return on Assets)  
The capital  market  rewards profitable 
firms  by increasing their  share  price, 
which, provides managers with incen-
tives to generate greater information in 
the  annual  reports.  Previous  studies 
(Wallace  and  Naser  1995;  Inchausti 
1997) argue that ROA  is an important 
factor affecting the level at which firms 
release obligatory data on corporate re-
ports.  Other  previous  studies  suggest 
that  compliance with international ac-
counting standards by profitable firms is 
one way to signal superior performance 
to  the  market  (Dumontier  and  Raf-
fournier 1998). Leuz (2003) forecasted 
that firms with large profits are more 
likely to comply with international ac-
counting standards that with firms with 
smaller profits. It is, therefore, hypothe-
sised on the relationship between ROA 
and compliance requirements in Indone-
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sia, that: 
H5
 : There is a positive relationship be-
tween  firms  with  larger  ROA 
(Return on Assets) and the level of 
IARC of the firms 
 
Industry categories   
 
The application of accounting policies 
might differ by industry (Mubarak and 
Hassan 2006). 
 
The  characteristics  of  industries  may 
show up differences in disclosure and 
reporting regulatory compliance (Ghose 
2006). Many past studies (Ng and Koh 
1993; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999; 
Taplin, Tower and Hancock 2002) have 
classified industry by four  categories: 
resources, manufacturers, financial, and 
services industries. However, the indus-
try environment in Indonesia is unique. 
Rosser  (1999)  and  Craig  and  Diga 
(1998) note that the real estate industry 
is one of dominant sectors in Indonesian 
economy activities.  Financial industries 
are excluded, because they are funda-
mentally different and they have their 
own rules from Central Bank (Bank In-
donesia).  Four  industry categories for 
industry classification are thus utilized: 
resources firms, manufacturers, real es-
tates  companies,  and  services  entities 
industries. It is hypothesized that: 
H6: There is a relationship between in-
dustry categories and the level of 
IARC of the firms 
 
 
Research methods 
 
Dependent variables 
 
This study examines factors that influ-
ence Indonesian listed companies com-
pliance (IARC) with the Indonesian ac-
counting standards of inventory, fixed 
asset, and depreciation of fixed assets 
(IAI  2006).  The  level  of  compliance 
with each of these Indonesian account-
ing standards  is measured by a self con-
structed  compliance  index  consistent 
with  prior  studies  (Al-Basteki  1995; 
Dumontier  and  Raffournier  1998;  El-
Gazzar, Finn and Jacob 1999; Murphy 
1999; Tower et al. 1999; Street and Bry-
ant 2000; Street and Gray 2002; Glaum 
and  Street  2003;  Tarca  2004).  These 
standards are composed of the following 
number of explicit requirements:  inven-
tory - 9 requirements; fixed asset – 16 
requirements and depreciation - 4  re-
quirements, a total of 29 items (Setyadi, 
Rusmin, Brown and Tower 2007). Con-
sistent with prior studies each required 
item on the checklist is coded one if it is 
disclosed and zero if the item is not dis-
closed. The IARCinv is computed as the 
actual  total  number  of  inventory  re-
quired items provided by the Indonesian
-listed companies on their annual reports 
divided by the maximum inventory ap-
plicable score. IARCfa is calculated as 
the actual total number of fixed assets 
required items provided by the Indone-
sian-listed  companies  on  their  annual 
reports divided by the maximum fixed 
assets applicable score. IARCdep is com-
puted as the actual total number of de-
preciation required items provided by 
the Indonesian-listed companies on their 
annual reports divided by the maximum 
depreciation applicable score. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Consistent with Claessens et al., (2000), 
top one shareholder ownership is meas-
ured by the proportion of shares owned 
by the top one shareholder to the total 
number of shares issued. 
 
32                                A. Setyadi, et. al. / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1 (2009) 26-44                      
 
To accommodate, Indonesia’s two-tiered 
board structure, this study the ratio of 
the number of independent commission-
ers to the total number of commissioners 
on the board of commissioners is used as 
a proxy for corporate governance. 
 
Size of firm is measured by the log of a 
firm’s total assets in rupiah. Prior re-
search recognizes  the relationship be-
tween corporate reporting and firm size. 
Ahmed and Courtis  (1999)  state  that 
firm size an essential factor in corporate 
reporting. 
 
In  order  to keep auditors’  reputation, 
audit firms ask clients to disclose all im-
portant  information  in  their  report 
(Chalmers and Godfrey 2004). Consis-
tent  with  Barako,  Hancock  and  Izan 
(2006), this study measures auditor type 
by the presence of Big 4 auditors versus 
non Big 4 auditors  in  publicly listed 
firms where 1 if Big 4, and 0 if other-
wise. This is consistent with previous 
research 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) argue that the Board 
of Directors (in Indonesia’s case) are 
encouraged to disclose information in 
detail to maintain positions and compen-
sation. In this study, ROA is measured 
as net profit divided by total assets. This 
is consistent with prior studies (Ali, Ah-
med  and  Henry  2004;  Barako  et  al. 
2006). 
 
Finally,  four  industry  categories  are 
measured as classification of industries 
into resources, manufacturers, real es-
tate, and services. 
 
Four control variables are also analysed. 
Expert commissioners are measured as a 
ratio of the number of expert commis-
sioners to the total number of commis-
sioners on the Board of Commissioners. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
there is a strong link between leverage 
and disclosure; in this study, leverage is 
measured as a debt ratio defined as total 
debt to total assets. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) and Auch (2004) argue that busi-
ness complexity plays a role in the ex-
tent of compliance with accounting stan-
dards; this is measured as a presence of a 
subsidiary of a listed firm where 1 is a 
firm which has at least one subsidiary; 
and 0 is a firm which does not have any 
subsidiaries.  Lastly,  independent  audit 
committee is measured as ratio of the 
number of independent audit committee 
to the total number of committee on the 
Audit Committee (Klein 2002; Zhang, 
Zhou and Zhou 2007). 
 
Statistical analysis and sample selec-
tion 
 
This study uses multiple regression with 
three  metric  dependent  variables 
(Indonesian  Accounting  Regulatory 
Compliance - IARC: IARCinv,  IARCfa 
and  IARCdep)  and  five  independent 
variables  (top  one  shareholder,  inde-
pendent commissioners, and firm size as 
metric; and industry categories and audi-
tor  type as a  non-metric categorical), 
with  four  control  variables  (business 
complexity, and independent audit com-
mittee  as  non-metric  categorical;  and 
leverage as a metric). The main statisti-
cal method utilized to test hypotheses is 
Ordinary  Least  Square  (OLS)  regres-
sion: 
 
This study examines a random sample of 
160  annual  reports  of  non-financial 
listed companies on the JSX for the pe-
riod of 1 January to 31 December 2006. 
The sample is 56.74% (or 160 annual 
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reports) and derived from the population 
of 282 non-financial firms listed on JSX. 
Financial listed firms are excluded from 
this compliance study because they have 
their own rules from the Central Bank 
(Bank Indonesia).  Different  regulation 
applies to financial firms such as banks, 
insurance and investment companies, the 
unique nature of  transactions and the 
assets portfolio of such entities (Karim 
and Ahmed 2005). Annual reports are 
chosen as source of data because they 
are  easily  accessed  McQueen  2001), 
useful  (Yeoh  2005),  communicated 
widely (Anderson 1998; Beattie, McIn-
nes and Fearnley 2004), and financially 
focused. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
for all of the observations. It shows the 
mean of inventory compliance is 71.63% 
(standard deviation of 15.64%), with a 
minimum of 22.22% compliance and a 
maximum of 100.00% compliance. The 
mean  of  fixed  assets  compliance  is 
51.13% (standard deviation of 22.47%), 
with a minimum of 31.25% compliance 
and a  maximum of  100.00% compli-
ance. The mean of depreciation compli-
ance is 99.69% (standard deviation of 
2.786%), with a minimum of 75.00% 
compliance and a maximum of 100.00% 
compliance. There is only one company 
(PT  Jakarta  Setiabudi  Internasional 
Tbk.) that totally complied with the ac-
counting standards requirements.  
The mean of ownership concentration 
(top one shareholder) is 46.11% with a 
lowest  concentration  of  6.64% and a 
highest  ownership  concentration  of 
92.88%. The mean level of independent 
commissioners is 40.91% ranging from 
20.00% to 80.00%. The mean indicates 
that, on average Indonesian firms-listed 
have  total  assets  of 
IDR4,286,884.75million  (standard  de-
viation: IDR10,961,151.33million). The 
mean indicates that, on average Indone-
sian firms-listed have ROA of 3.60% 
(standard deviation: 10.32%). On aver-
age Indonesian firms-listed has leverage 
of 52.28% (standard deviation: 31.88%). 
The mean of independent audit commit-
tee  is  30.99%  ranging  from  0%  to 
66.67% and the mean of Expert commis-
sioners is 51.72% ranging from 0% to 
100.00% (see Table 1).  
No.   Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
1 IARCinv 22.22 100.00 71.63 77.78 15.64 
2 IARCfa 31.25 100.00 51.13 37.50 22.47 
3 IARCdep 75.00 100.00 99.69 100.00 2.79 
4 TopOne 6.64 92.88 46.11 48.67 20.62 
5 IndCom 20.00 80.00 40.91 40.00 10.56 
6 Size -Log 8.85 18.23 13.76 13.89 1.79 
7 Size (Assets)2 7000.00 82333378.00 4286884.75 1075000.00 10961151.33 
8 ROA 
-78.01 37.22 3.60 3.30 10.32 
9 Leverage 0.10 221.43 52.28 51.24 31.88 
10 IndAC 0.00 66.67 30.99 33.33 15.23 
11 ExpCom 0.00 100.00 51.72 50.00 31.98 
2
  Size (Assets): Total assets (in million rupiah). 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics 
for  individual  accounting  standards, 
from INV1 (Lower of cost and net realiz-
able value) to DEP4 (Consistent from 
period to period) (29 compliance items: 
inventory – 9 items, fixed assets – 16 
items, and depreciation – 4 items). It 
shows the level of compliance of compa-
nies  with  each  individual  accounting 
standard. It also shows the highest level 
of compliance of companies with FA1 
(Fixed assets that qualifies for recogni-
tion as an asset), FA2 (Recorded at its 
cost), FA8 (The gross carrying amount), 
FA9 (Accumulated depreciation at the 
beginning and end of the period), DEP1 
(Allocation  on  a  systematic  basis), 
DEP3 (The depreciation method used) 
and DEP4 (The useful lives) compliance 
with score of 100% respectively. How-
ever, it shows the lowest level of com-
pliance  of  companies  with  FA11 
(Independent valuer was involved) com-
pliance with score of 14%.  
No. Variable Title % Compliance 
1 INV1 Lower of cost and net realizable value 0.94 
2 INV3 Cost of formulas 0.91 
3 INV6 Total carrying amount 0.91 
4 INV7 Appropriate classification to the entity 0.91 
5 INV5 Accounting policy 0.90 
6 INV2 The cost of inventories 0.54 
7 INV8 Fair value less costs to sell 0.43 
8 INV4 Recognition as an expense 0.29 
9 INV9 The amount of inventories recognized as an expense during the 
period 0.23 
10 FA1 Fixed assets that qualifies for recognition as an asset 1.00 
11 FA2 Recorded at its cost 1.00 
12 FA8 The gross carrying amount 1.00 
13 FA9 Accumulated depreciation at the beginning and end of the period 1.00 
14 FA3 Amount of accumulated depreciation 0.99 
15 FA7 Measurement of gross carrying amount 0.99 
16 FA4 Revaluation of fixed assets 0.33 
17 FA5 Explain the effect of revaluation 0.31 
18 FA6 Difference between revaluation value and book value must be 
recorded on equity account 0.24 
19 FA10 Effective date of the revaluation 0.24 
20 FA15 Each re-valued class of fixed asset 0.20 
21 FA12 The revaluation methods used for fixed assets 0.19 
22 FA16 The amount of revaluation reserve 0.19 
23 FA13 Significant assumptions for items’ fair values 0.18 
24 FA14 Items’ fair values were determined 0.18 
25 FA11 Independent valuer was involved 0.14 
26 DEP1 Allocation on a systematic basis 1.00 
27 DEP3 The depreciation method used 1.00 
28 DEP4 The useful lives 1.00 
29 DEP2 Consistent from period to period 0.99 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for individual accounting standards 
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Table 3 shows the frequency of auditor 
type indicating that the Big 4 firms audit 
49% (or 78) of listed companies in Indo-
nesia.  It  also illustrates  that  84% (or 
134) of the company has at least one 
subsidiary. Table 4 also highlights the 
four industry categories of listed compa-
nies in Indonesia have a wide range. Re-
sources has 18% (or 29), manufacturers 
has 27% (or 43), real estates has 17% 
(or 28), and services has 38% (or 60). 
Univariate t-tests and ANOVA statistical 
analysis reveal that the different means 
of compliance between auditor type and 
business complexity are not statistically 
significant for IARCinv, IARCfa, and 
IARCdep. However, there are clear in-
dustry differences; the results indicate 
that four industry categories are signifi-
cant with p-value of 0.00 (p<0.01) only 
for IARCfa. 
  N Percent of 
compa-
nies 
IARCinv 
mean 
IARCfa 
mean 
IARCdep 
mean 
IARCinv 
T-test 
  
IARCfa 
T-test 
  
IARCdep 
T-test 
  
            F Sig. (p-
value) 
F Sig. (p-
value) 
F Sig. (p-
value) 
Audited by:                       
Non Big 4 82 51 71.69 50.23 100.00             
Big 4 78 49 71.58 52.08 99.36             
Total 160 100 71.63 51.13 99.69 0.00 0.96 0.271 0.60 2.13 0.15 
                        
Business com-
plexity: 
                      
Company has 
no subsidiary 
26 16 73.61 51.20 100.00             
Company has 
subsidiary 
134 84 71.26 51.12 99.63             
Total 160 100 71.63 51.13 99.69 0.46 0.50 0.000 0.99 0.39 0.53 
Four industry 
categories: 
          IARCinv 
ANOVA 
IARCfa 
ANOVA 
IARCdep 
ANOVA 
1. Resources 29 18 70.09 45.04 99.14             
2. Manufactur-
ers 
43 27 73.90 61.77 99.42             
3. Real estate 28 17 72.84 47.32 100.00             
4. Services 60 38 69.96 48.23 100.00             
Total 160 100 71.63 51.13 99.69 0.64 0.59 4.854 0.00* 0.88 0.46 
Legend:  * denotes statistically highly significant at p<0.01 
Further Statistical Analysis 
 
Correlations3 
 
Table 4 reports Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients. The upper half 
is Pearson pair-wise coefficients and the 
lower half is Spearman correlation coef-
ficients.  Both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations show a statistically signifi-
cant correlation between size of firm and 
auditor type (p<0.01) and give the high-
Table 3 Frequency and comparison of compliance means 
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est  correlation coefficients,  0.418 and 
0.438 respectively. Since the variables 
are to be used in regression analysis and 
as these correlation values are below the 
critical limits of 0.80 (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham and Black 1995; Cooper  and 
Schindler 2003; Ghozali 2005), it is sug-
gested that a multicollinearity problem 
between independent variables is not a 
serious concern.  
Multiple regressions 
 
Table  5  communicates  the  results  of 
multiple regressions4 analysis of inven-
tory  compliance,  fixed  assets  compli-
ance, and depreciation compliance. The 
table provides p-values and coefficients 
of all independent variables in the re-
gression model. It illustrates that for in-
ventory compliance: auditor type, busi-
Multiple Regression 
Model Findings 
  IARCinv IARCfa IARCdep 
n 160  Annual  Re-
ports 
160 Annual Reports 160 Annual Reports 
F Value 1.08 1.35 0.45 
Significance 0.38 0.21 0.92 
Adjusted R Squared 0.01 0.02 -0.04 
Variables Β P-Value Β P-Value Β P-Value 
Constant or intercept 3.09 0.00 -0.22 0.83 37.57 0.00 
Auditor type -1.11 0.27 -1.38 0.17 -0.72 0.47 
Business complexity -1.26 0.21 -0.77 0.45 -0.40 0.69 
Industry categories 0.49 0.63 0.17 0.87 1.12 0.27 
Top One shareholder 0.10 0.92 1.65 0.10 -0.28 0.78 
Independent commis-
sioners -0.67 0.50 0.16 0.87 -0.23 0.82 
Firm’s Size (Log)1 2.16 0.03** 2.66 0.01** -0.19 0.85 
Return on Assets 1.59 0.12 1.09 0.28 -0.41 0.68 
Leverage 0.60 0.55 0.81 0.42 -0.05 0.96 
Independent audit com-
mittee -0.24 0.81 0.76 0.45 -0.40 0.69 
Expert commissioners 1.07 0.29 0.62 0.54 0.09 0.93 
Notes: 1 Firm’s Size is transformed into log form to avoid skewness. 
* Highly significant at the level of 1%; ** Significant at the level of 5%;  
*** Moderately significant at the level of 10% 
Table 5 
Results of multiple regressions analysis of IARCinv, IARCfa and IARCdep5 
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ness complexity, industry categories, top 
one shareholder, independent commis-
sioners,  ROA,  leverage,  independent 
audit committee, and expert commission-
ers are not found to be significant pre-
dictors of the extent of inventory compli-
ance since their  p-values  (0.27,  0.21, 
0.63, 0.92, 0.51, 0.12, 0.55, 0.81, and 
0.29) are greater than the 0.05 (p>0.05) 
significance level. However, firm size is 
significant  with  its  p-value  of  0.03 
(p<0.05). Therefore, hypothesis 3 (H3: 
size of firm) is accepted. 
 
The table illustrates that for fixed assets 
compliance: auditor type, business com-
plexity, industry categories, top one 
shareholder, independent commission-
ers, ROA, leverage, independent audit 
committee, and expert commissioners are 
not found to be significant predictors of the 
extent of inventory compliance since their p-
values (0.17, 0.45, 0.87, 0.10, 0.87, 0.28, 
0.42, 0.45, and 0.54) are greater than the 
0.05 (p>0.05) significance level. However, 
firm size is significant with its p-value of 
0.01 (p<0.05). Therefore, hypothesis 3 (H3: 
size of firm) is accepted. 
 
The table also illustrates that for deprecia-
tion compliance, there is no significant pre-
dictors of the extent of depreciation compli-
ance since their p-values are greater than the 
0.05 (p>0.05) significance level. 
 
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 
This study provides an analysis of the 
extent to which Indonesian-listed firms 
comply with Indonesian accounting 
standards. Compliance index is a self 
constructed based on a 29 item of Indo-
nesian accounting standards and derived 
from Indonesian accounting standards 
on inventory, fixed assets, and deprecia-
tion (Setyadi et al. 2007). Using 160 non
-financial Indonesian-listed companies’ 
2006 annual reports, this study observes 
the extent of compliance with the Indo-
nesian accounting standards. 
 
Multiple regressions analysis finds that 
firm’s size is significant for inventory 
compliance and fixed assets compliance 
with p-values of 0.03 and 0.01 (p<0.05). 
However, firm’s size is not significant, 
for depreciation compliance. The re-
sults, for inventory compliance, support 
hypothesis 3 (H3: size of firm). Simi-
larly, for fixed assets compliance, the 
results support hypothesis 3 (H3: size of 
firm). 
 
These findings highlight the importance 
of the enforcement issue for firms listed 
on Jakarta Stock Exchange to comply 
with the regulator’s rules. The goal is to 
enhance firms’ exposure to stakeholders. 
The benefits derived from compliance 
with the Indonesian accounting stan-
dards could include a reduction in costs 
associated with agency costs. Analysis 
reveals a high level of 71.63% inventory 
compliance, 51.13% fixed assets compli-
ance, and 99.69% depreciation compli-
ance with accounting rules. Although 
3
 This study further analysed Tukey HSD (honesty sig-
nificant different) post hoc test, multiple comparisons of 
four industry categories for inventory compliance, fixed 
assets compliance, and depreciation compliance. The 
results illustrates that manufacturers have fundamentally 
higher compliance than resources, real estate, and ser-
vices firms with its p-values of 0.01, 0.03, and 0.01 
respectively (p<0.05), for fixed assets compliance. In 
addition, three ANOVAs show that the only fixed assets 
compliance is significant with its p-value of 0.00.   
4
  This study further analysed possible outliers by using 
Cook’s distance, and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) 
and Tolerance the summary scores showed no problem. 
However, further analysis using the Mahalanobis dis-
tance measure highlight possible concerns. Therefore, 
the statistical analysis was run with and without possible 
Mahalanobis-linked outliers.  The results were funda-
mentally similar to the original analysis, therefore the 
full data set is used in all statistical presentations. 
5
 Backward regressions have been done and give the 
same statistical result as the full regression model. 
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Indonesian firms may have complied 
with more than 50% of the key account-
ing rule provisions, regulatory interven-
tion is still needed for making Indone-
sian firms fully comply with Indonesian 
accounting regulations. Such regulation 
might include sanctions as promulgated 
by multilateral financial organisations 
(World Bank 2005). To ensure public 
accountability regulation might be ad-
ministered with enforcement power and 
vigorous to monitor (Tower 1993). The 
results show the government needs to play 
more roles in enforcement of accounting 
standards to ensure more efficient business 
operation. For example, this study finds the 
mean of independent commissioners 
(40.91%) and independent audit committee 
(30.99%) are less than 50% indicating gov-
ernment enforcement is important. This is 
consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2004) who suggest the impor-
tant of government enforcement roles in 
capital market, and suggest to the need for 
legal reform to support capital market devel-
opment. 
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